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Life at the Meridian: The Subjectivity of Ethics in the Works of Albert Camus and  
Friedrich Nietzsche  
In the vibrant threshold of ideas and senses that is our world, life can frequently be 
paralyzed by dichotomy. This is, or that is. People often divide into various camps based on a 
certain unifying dogma, seeking objective faith in a specific institution, religion, or doctrine. A 
fairly prevalent conception that polarizes people is the belief or nonbelief in the existence of a 
god. While belief or nonbelief is not a problem within itself, it is a dangerous thing to readily 
accept dichotomies such as the Pascalian “God is, or God is not”1 declaration without first 
contemplating the plethora of shades that could exist in-between or outside of these ends. Both 
Friedrich Nietzsche and Albert Camus worked ardently to expand and exhaust these traditional 
limits, flipping many classical ideas about ethics and morals on their heads. Before entering the 
treacherous depths of existential subjectivity, however, it is important to ask: can ethics can be 
unbound from its traditional rootedness in religious systems? If so, what contributions did 
Nietzsche make to liberate value from the shackles of Western morality? To what degree is 
Camus one of the “new philosophers” Nietzsche calls for in On the Genealogy of Morals?  
 In an attempt to demonstrate that ethics can and do exist vividly in the realm of the non-
religious, this paper will begin by illustrating the metaphysical door Nietzsche opens through his 
use of aphorisms in Thus Spoke Zarathustra and his investigation of the history of Western 
                                                          
1 Pascal – Pensées – page 153 
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values in On the Genealogy of Morals. In these nihilistic inquiries Nietzsche collects and sorts 
values, razes traditional morals of the religious to the ground, and constructs a worldview based 
on an overman’s (Ubermensch) “will to power.” While Nietzsche is opening a necessary and 
legitimate door, in reality this mindset is akin to Ivan Karamazov’s “everything is permitted”2 
declaration that allows all actions, even those as extreme as murder. At this point Albert Camus 
responds to Nietzsche in his books The Stranger, The Myth of Sisyphus, and The Rebel by re-
imagining the deserted space beyond Nietzsche’s door. By actively rejecting any type of unifying 
principle, be it nihilism, religion, or objective conclusions about the world, Camus advocates for 
an individualistic and ultimately subjective mode of thought. Within this imagined space one is 
fundamentally free but proportionally lonely and responsible for one’s actions. Void of eternal 
hope and set free from traditional values, an individual is filled with the opportunity for 
creativity and constructs a universe for oneself.  
 In his works On the Genealogy of Morals and Thus Spoke Zarathustra Friedrich 
Nietzsche contemplates the danger of accepting traditional Western values that have been passed 
down as accepted Truths. In On the Genealogy of Morals Nietzsche begins by calling for a 
“critique of moral values, the value of...values themselves must first be called into question” 
(20). Morality, which is often synonymous with the “good,” “just,” and “correct” is inverted and 
sought after by Nietzsche as a “consequence, as a symptom, as mask, as tartufferie, as illness, as 
misunderstanding…as poison” (20). Nietzsche starts by tracing where the ideas of “good and 
evil” and “good and bad” derive from. He proposes that it was “the noble, powerful, high-
stationed and high-minded….[who] established themselves and their actions as good…[and] first 
seized the right to create values and to coin names for values” (26). The “pathos of distance” (26) 
                                                          
2 Dostoevsky – The Brothers Karamazov page 263 
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between these nobles and their opposites, or plebeians, thus formed the contrast between what is 
“good’ and what is “bad.” A fundamental weariness of objectivity is laced in with these words; 
Nietzsche does not believe that Truths exist by themselves but that those in power created values 
under the guise of Truth. Even from the beginning of his inquiry, Nietzsche derails the 
connotation of values by questioning the often accepted infrastructure. One is forced to ask: are 
values “good” within themselves or are they constructions by those in power to maintain said 
power? In this way Nietzsche commences collecting and sorting values, nudging a door open to a 
subjective land where he will soon attempt to raze religious values to the ground. 
 After questioning the value of “good” versus “bad,” Nietzsche continues to isolate 
“good” versus “evil.” He says that the conception of evil cultivated when the “priestly mode of 
valuation [branched]…off from the knightly-aristocratic and then developed into its opposite” 
(33).  They did this by “invert[ing] the aristocratic value-equation (good = noble = powerful = 
beautiful = happy = beloved of God)…saying ‘the wretched alone are the good; the poor, 
impotent, lowly alone are the good…and you, the powerful and noble, are on the contrary the 
evil, the cruel…the godless to all eternity; and you shall be in all eternity the unblessed, 
accursed, and damned!’” (34). The previously marginalized plebeians in the noble caste system 
created a system of values so that they could both gain power, and maintain it. According to 
Nietzsche only then, in the priestly caste, did “man become an interesting animal…only here did 
the human soul in a higher sense acquire depth and become evil” (33). Here Nietzsche takes a 
traditional sentiment, a beatitude3 from the Christian Bible, and questions its authority. He argues 
that the gentle, poor, pious, and weak are not innately “good” and that the rich, noble, powerful, 
                                                          




and strong are not “evil;” these valuations have been assigned by the priestly caste who crave 
power. This reasoning undermines religion and Christianity as the primary authority on Western 
morality and truth, thereby opening a space for new valuations.  
 In Part II of On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche divulges in a rather intricate tracing 
of values where he explores terms such as “bad conscience,” “guilt,” and “justice;” however, a 
thorough retelling of his entire investigation is not necessary for this paper. Nietzsche is 
influential to the extent to which he begins flipping classically accepted values on their heads, 
reevaluating deeply-rooted institutions. The crux of this type of thinking, or Nietzsche’s 
methodology, comes when the religious and specifically Christian mindset is analyzed. Jesus of 
Nazareth, “the incarnate gospel of love…a ‘Redeemer’ who brought blessedness and victory to 
the poor” is first brought into the light as Nietzsche asks if he was not “seduction in its most 
uncanny and irresistible form” (35). Nietzsche posits that Jesus is a “part of the secret black art 
of truly grand politics of revenge” when the image of “God on the cross” is there “for the 
salvation of man” (35). As opposed to seeing Jesus, the supposed son of God, dying on the cross 
as the eternal sacrifice of love, Nietzsche argues that it is actually an act of ultimate revenge to 
subjugate the masses. The herd that forms waits for “the victory of God, of the just God, over the 
godless” (48). There is a certain degree of vengefulness here; heaven is promised to the believers 
while hell awaits those who refuse to join the “herd.” Nietzsche directly addresses Christians in 
Thus Spoke Zarathustra when he says, “You who are virtuous still want to be paid! Do you want 
rewards for virtue, and heaven for earth, and the eternal for your today? And now you are angry 
with me because I teach that there is no reward and paymaster? And verily, I do not even teach 
that virtue is its own reward” (93). Here, a darker shade of the religious mindset is exposed. If 
the mob is “good” only out of fear of punishment and in anticipation of future bliss, is this 
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“goodness?” The value of value itself becomes debatable as Nietzsche slowly deconstructs 
existing systems based on “good” and “evil.” Nietzsche is highlighting that while one of faith 
may see Christianity as an institution of love, it can also be viewed as a cult of exclusivity and 
hate. Using this type of logic, Nietzsche razes traditional morals to the ground, interrogating 
existing institutions that were rarely questioned in this way before.   
 After systematically deconstructing traditional Western ideas about values, Nietzsche 
creates a desert of sorts, void of everything but a philosophy of nihilism, nothingness, and 
subjectivity. Speaking in aphorisms in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche begins to lyrically 
paint a new kind of philosopher to rule in this desert – the overman, or Ubermensch. This work 
posits that “the overman is the meaning of the earth…[or rather] the overman shall be the 
meaning of the earth” (13). Nietzsche has hope that a new kind of godless man will emerge who 
will have a “will, not will to life but…will to power” (115). The overman when free and alone 
can master this will to power to the point where the “will” becomes creative; all will be in 
shambles “until the creative will says to it, ‘But thus I will it; thus shall I will it’” (141). It is now 
a thing of the past “to view nature as if it were a proof of the goodness and providence of a God; 
to interpret history to the glory of divine reason…as if everything were preordained, everything a 
sign” (On the Genealogy of Morals 161). The will to truth of the religious is replaced by the 
thrumming creative present and will to power of the overman. In a way, individualism is deified, 
filling the gap where the old notion of god was thrown out. Nietzsche, in the end, leaves both 
Thus Spoke Zarathustra and On the Genealogy of Morals rather open-ended, alluding to hopes of 
a “new philosopher” or overman to rule in the desert where the only subjective idea is this will to 
power. It is clear that Nietzsche’s thoughts are groundbreaking in that they deconstruct the 
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dominant narrative of Western morality in a very unique way. It remains to be seen, however, 
whether or not this philosophy is transferrable to reality or if it should be.  
 In his essay on metaphysical rebellion called The Rebel, Albert Camus delivers a lucid 
analysis of Nietzsche by holding his philosophy up to scrutiny by the unforgiving eyes of logic 
and history. First, it must be acknowledged that Nietzsche has undergone quite a bit of criticism, 
especially by his religious contemporaries. A common misconception surrounding Nietzsche is 
this idea that he wants to “kill God” when he says that “God is dead.” Camus points out, 
however, “contrary to the opinion of certain Christian critics, Nietzsche did not form a project to 
kill God. He found Him dead in the soul of his contemporaries” (68). As previously explored, 
Nietzsche is not concerned with this figure of “God” or traditional values but instead replaces 
“God” with this hope for the coming of the overman with a will to power. Camus, as opposed to 
certain religious critics, holds Nietzsche in deep reverence; however, it will be seen that he 
fundamentally disagrees with Nietzsche’s conclusions. In this way, Camus provides a unique 
insight into the world of Nietzsche, scrutinizing without the bias of religion, analyzing with 
creativity, and exploring with a genuine will to understand what repercussions Nietzschean 
thought has had on the individual and the world.    
Camus’ criticism of Nietzsche begins on a strictly ideological level when he unravels to 
what extent pure nihilism is an appeal for unity and if it necessitates madness in the individual. 
To begin, Camus says,  
“One hundred and fifty years of metaphysical rebellion and of nihilism have witnessed 
the persistent reappearance, under different guises, of the same ravaged countenance: the 
face of human protest. All of them, decrying the human condition and its Creator, have 
affirmed the solitude of man and the nonexistence of any kind of morality…As rivals of 
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the Creator, they have inescapably been led to the point of reconstructing creation 
according to their own concepts…But Sade and the romantics, Karamazov or Nietzsche 
only entered the world of death because they wanted to discover the true life. So that by a 
process of inversion, it is the desperate appeal for order that rings through this insane 
universe…In the eyes of the rebel, what is missing from the misery of the world, as well 
as from its moments of happiness, is some principle by which they can be explained…He 
is seeking, without knowing it, a moral philosophy or a religion…Therefore, if the rebel 
blasphemes, it is in the hope of finding a new god.” (100-101) 
Here, Camus is insinuating that Nietzsche is a rebel who no longer allows himself the belief in 
“God” to make sense of the world but still secretly desires unity or an overarching concept to 
explain everything, good and bad. In a way, old religions are now replaced with a new pseudo-
religion where the only value is hope for a future overman with an acute will to power. Although 
Nietzsche’s desire for a unifying principle is not a discrediting factor within itself, Camus posits 
that these new ideas are not a creation of new values but rather just a negation of old values. 
Instead of God and hope for a future of heavenly bliss, Nietzsche holds up an ideal of 
individualistic power and a philosophical future based not on the good4 but its absence. Camus is 
subtlety suggesting that Nietzsche’s ideas are, in reality, contingent upon these old systems of 
thought. In this way, Camus has merely redefined or re-casted Nietzsche’s philosophy in a 
unique light, describing it as a desire for clarity with “new” overarching values as opposed to 
radical creationism. It remains to be seen what the real issue is that emerges from this type of 
negation.     
                                                          
4 Refers to the classical value of “the good” as found in Plato’s Republic  
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 Camus poignantly highlights the dangers of a Nietzschean nihilistic philosophy when 
internalized by the individual in his discussion of Ivan Karamazov from Dostoevsky’s The 
Brothers Karamazov. According to Camus, “Ivan incarnates the refusal of salvation. Faith leads 
to immortal life. But faith presumes the acceptance of the mystery and of evil, and resignation to 
injustice…He throws in his lot with the damned and, for their sake, rejects eternity” (56). 
Essentially, Ivan wants justification for the unjustifiable; he yearns for a principle that will 
explain why there is suffering in the world and cannot fathom how a “good” God could possible 
exist in a world with such tragedy. From this rejection of God’s system Ivan concludes with the 
principle that “‘everything is permitted,’ [and here] the history of contemporary nihilism really 
begins” (57). The problem with this mindset is that “the unity of the world, which was not 
achieved with God, will henceforth be attempted in defiance of God,” and in this way “Ivan 
offers us only the tortured face of the rebel plunged in the abyss, incapable of action, torn 
between the idea of his own innocence and the desire to kill…With him the rebellion of reason 
culminates in madness” (61). It seems that the new value that both Ivan and Nietzsche create for 
themselves comes from a place of spite for this allusive “God.” This motive of resentment, this 
value of permitting all, this desire for power, and this search for a future overman does not cause 
madness. Nevertheless, there is a correlation between living at this high pitch of indignation and 
madness. To summarize, although the most compelling criticism that Camus has of Nietzsche 
has yet to be explained, for now it will suffice to say that even on an individual level, nihilism is 
a dangerous, isolating, and hazardous path to take.  
Camus’ most effective investigation of Nietzsche comes when he traces nihilism 
throughout various rebellions in history, demonstrating the disastrous and bloody effects that this 
philosophy can have in reality. The first example that Camus gives involves Russian terrorism in 
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the late 1800’s when a man named Kravchinsky created a pamphlet called Death for Death 
(165). Although not directly stated, this pamphlet advocated the death of leaders around the 
world in order to arbitrarily defend the population’s “human rights.” What followed were the 
attempts on the lives of various European leaders, from the Emperor of Germany in 1878 to the 
Grand Duke of Sergei in 1905. Camus describes this movement as “nihilism, intimately involved 
with a frustrated religious movement…[that] culminate[d] in terrorism. In the universe of total 
negation, these young disciples tr[ied], with bombs, and revolvers…to escape from contradiction 
and to create the values they lack” (165). The mindset of these young Russian terrorists is eerily 
similar to Nietzsche’s philosophy, in that one begins by destroying accepted systems in order to 
create one’s own values in a coup de’ etat, or will to power. It is interesting that on a deeper level 
these men sacrificed present lives for the hope of a better future, and a more just future. For the 
Russian terrorists “these men of the future remained, in the absence of supreme values, their last 
recourse…the future is the only transcendental value for men without God” (166). Justice in the 
future, the deification of man in the future became the overarching value for these godless rebels. 
These revolutionists lived in an “everything is permitted” state, murder and suicide included, in 
an abstract hope that there would be a future with supreme men and godless values. This “ends 
justifies the means” mentality is fatal, especially when hope for an abstract future is paid for by 
the lives of living men. Already is can be seen that Nietzschean nihilism, when transferred to 
reality, can lead to the tangible death of individuals; the “will to power” begins to smell of blood.  
Camus continues his discussion of terrorism by separating it into two branches: irrational 
terror and rational terror. He describes the “state” as a “logical conclusion of inordinate technical 
and philosophical ambitions, foreign to the true spirit of rebellion” which came about “after the 
city of God had been razed to the ground…[and] was founded on terror” (177). The primary 
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example of an irrational state of terror is Hitler’s regime where “one leader, one people, 
signifi[ed] one master and millions of slaves” (182). An interesting insight that Camus provides 
about this regime is that “Hitler, though he could have stopped the war before the point of total 
disaster, really wanted universal suicide and the material and political destruction of the German 
nation” (185). This nihilistic revolution was deeply rooted in a “passion for nothingness” (185) 
and Hitler irrationally desired the death of all for the glory of one. Typically, the Nazi state has 
been understood as an apparatus of hate directed toward the Jewish people; the end goal of 
Nazism being the Jewish people’s complete annihilation. Although this is true, Camus takes 
Hitler’s motives to their logical end, which would be the death of all, not just the Jewish people. 
In a way, Hitler embodied the ideals of a Nietzschean overman and irrationally craved the 
destruction of all to make room for the creation and glorification of an individual. Although 
Nietzsche’s “will to power” idea does not necessitate a Hitlerian regime, it does not forbid it, 
which is a problem to say the least. The transfer of this “will to power” philosophy from the 
realm of ideas to the realm of the senses can result in mass murder and genocide.  
To conclude his comparison between Nietzschean nihilism and reality, Camus discusses 
the various types of sanctioned state terror that underlie socialism and fascism in the 20th 
century. Camus proposes that socialism originates from a “criticism of religion” which leads to 
“this doctrine that man is for man the supreme being. From this angle, socialism is therefore an 
enterprise for the deification of man and has assumed some of the characteristics of traditional 
religions” (192). Socialism, influenced by nihilism, deifies man instead of god and replaces the 
value of heaven with the value of and hope for “utopia” (208). The problem arises, however, 
when “the only values are those which serve this particular future [or Utopia]” (208). This 
“particular future” is subjective and can be based on an individual’s will to power, leaving the 
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masses vulnerable to marginalization. Although hope for a better future of supposed equality is 
not a terrible prospect, this idea is incomprehensible on a number of levels. Camus argues that 
this type of logic, though it pretends to be revolutionary, is actually a “pseudo-revolutionary 
mystification…[where] all freedom must be crushed in order to conquer the empire, and one day 
the empire will be the equivalent of freedom. And so the way to unity passes through totality” 
(233). Socialism, following the same train of thought that Nietzsche presents, sacrifices the 
present for the hope of a utopian future. This “rational terror” is less extreme than “irrational 
terror” in that it is not as linked to murder; however, it is tied to subjection. There is irony here in 
that “man takes refuge in the permanence of the party in the same way that he formerly 
prostrated himself before the altar. That is why the era which dares to claim that it is the most 
rebellious that has ever existed only offers a choice of various types of conformity. The real 
passion of the twentieth century is servitude” (234). Unity, the desire for overarching values in a 
very confusing existence, seems to hide in various costumes. According to Camus, the end result 
of socialism and religion is the same: the subjection of people under unifying values to explain 
the universe. Niezschean nihilism, when transferred to reality, also appears to follow a similar 
formula. Although nihilism does not necessitate classic equality like socialism, it still attempts to 
sort and collect values, glorifying the individual through a permeating value. In this, it is not a 
leap to say that Nietzsche’s historical analysis of the death of god and his view of values created 
by an ubermensch who acts out of a sheer will to power influenced leaders like Hitler. Although 
nihilism is not responsible for the actions of these leaders, it can be said that this pool of thought 
has a close relationship with madness, murder, and genocide. We are left with abstract ideals and 
tangible deaths.   
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At this point, Camus has critiqued Nietzsche, highlighting the flaws of nihilism on an 
individual, social, and historical level. However, regardless of possible concrete consequences of 
nihilism, Nietzsche’s groundbreaking contribution to philosophy and existentialism remains. His 
probing in Thus Spoke Zarathustra and On the Genealogy of Morals put the trajectory of 
traditional morals under a large amount of scrutiny, figuratively opening up a door to a new land 
without hope, without god, and without morals. Even though Camus evidently sees the deadly 
flaws in this vision, he does not disregard Nietzsche; instead, he begins to re-imagine a space 
beyond this door in The Stranger, The Myth of Sisyphus, and The Rebel. Through these works it 
will be demonstrated how Camus attempts to bring clarity to the questions asked at the beginning 
of this paper: Does existence necessarily involve a dichotomy? Does an individual have to be 
hyper-religious or hyper-nihilistic? Piecing together a new mindset about existence essentially 
different from that of Nietzsche’s, we will see how Camus forms a tension filled vision in the 
dust of a wasteland; a progression from absurdity to rebellion alive in the incandescent present.    
Camus begins his inquiry into the void with his short novel The Stranger which tells the 
tale of an unassuming Frenchman named Mersault who commits murder for no particular reason 
besides the fact that the sun was uncomfortably hot on that day. This book acts as a way to 
demonstrate what Camus coins the absurd, or a person’s general dizziness when confronted with 
themselves and the world aside from a few moments of arbitrary connectedness with others and 
nature. Mersault is presented as an apathetic, almost emotionless character who does not shed a 
tear when his mother dies and once stated that “the sound (of other people) was like the muffled 
jabber of parakeets” (5). While the absurd is a difficult concept to define, it is represented well in 
the relationship between Mersault and his love interest, Marie. The day after his mother dies, 
Mersault describes a pleasant swim with Marie when he says, “It was nice…I had the whole sky 
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in my eyes and it was blue and gold. On the back of my neck I could feel Marie’s heart beating 
softly. We lay on the float for a long time, half asleep” (20). Camus uses simple, plain language 
here to exemplify that there is no value or meaning behind this moment, but that it is “nice” and 
more importantly random. Later on, Mersault describes a time when Marie asked if he loved her; 
he says, “I told her it didn’t mean anything but that I didn’t think so” (35). The absurd in its most 
raw state is this exact sensation of disenchantment, of having “good” moments with others in the 
world but not attributing any permanent meaning to these feelings. Here, Camus starts to 
question whether or not there is an innate connection between external events and internal 
feelings, or if it is an institutionalized ethic.   
The climax of The Stranger comes when Mersault kills an Arab man on the beach after 
shooting him five times in the chest. During his trial Mersault cannot give any reason for killing 
the man besides the fact that the sun was too hot that day and that something like a “thick 
drunkenness” (57) spilled all over his body in that moment. By the end of the trial, when he is 
found guilty and condemned to death, Mersault says, “I…lived my life one way and I could just 
as well have lived it another, I had done this and I hadn’t done that….And so?...Nothing, nothing 
mattered” (121). There is a sense that Mersault is a passive bystander to his own life; he does not 
understand other people’s conception that there is a correlation between feelings, events, and 
actions. Additionally, he does not seem to be conscious of his situation. Things happen to 
Mersault, or do not happen, but there does not appear to be an internal recognition of either. At 
one point, during his trial, Mersault thinks, “everything is happening without my participation. 
My fate [is] being decided without anyone so much as asking my opinion” (98). Consciousness 
is an active state, and Mersault remains passive. Through his passive mindset, Mersault is neither 
in control of his external body or internal thoughts.  
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At his point Mersault has been presented as a murderer without an acute consciousness of 
his situation. It could be said that Camus is promoting arbitrary murder or general alienation 
through the passive character of Mersault. Against this view, we will argue that in The Stranger, 
Camus undertakes a project to identify exactly what the absurd would look like if it were 
embodied within a person. The absurd, which is a permeating aspect of the human experience 
according to Camus, is amplified in the story of Mersault as to conceptualize the absurd before 
integrating it into ideas about consciousness and rebellion. The essence of Mersault functions as 
a building block, undermining accepted ideas about the correlation between an individual’s 
external and internal worlds and isolating the absurd as an entity.        
In his next work The Myth of Sisyphus, Camus articulates what the absurd is and is not by 
exploring what freedom can be found in the absurd, lucidly discussing suicide and examining 
mythological Sisyphus as an absurd hero. At this point in his oeuvre, following his attempt to 
establish the desert beyond Nietzsche’s door, Camus has only shown us the face of a 
disillusioned murderer Mersault. In this anti-hero the absurd is raw and unhindered by 
previously held values like human empathy or the sacredness of the created world. Camus 
progresses beyond Mersault when he paints a picture of absurdity in Myth of Sisyphus, saying, 
“At the heart of all beauty lies something inhuman, and these hills, the softness of the sky, the 
outline of these trees that this very minute lose the illusory meaning with which we had clothed 
them…The primitive hostility of the world rises up to face us across millennia…that denseness 
and that strangeness of the world is absurd” (14). There is a sense here that the absurd defines a 
human’s innate connection with the world and with nature, but that there is no rational 
explanation behind or following this association. For Camus “beauty” is not a good or bad thing 
but rather an external fact that catalyzes a human’s experience of internal weariness. Humans 
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want to understand their condition and crave value; however, this is where the absurd is cradled, 
“born of this confrontation between the human need and the unreasonable silence of the world” 
(28). An absurd man says, “I don’t know whether this world has a meaning that transcends it. 
But I know that I do not know that meaning and that it is impossible for me just now to know it” 
(51). Absurdity involves a position of resignation in the pursuit of value, in which a person trades 
the belief in an overarching moral and metaphysical unity for the harsh experience of living in 
tension. In a way absurdity is both the sickness and the cure: the freedom for man without god in 
the world and the binding of man to a perpetual tension between freedom and subjugation 
without purpose. The absurd is not a religion, a valuation, or a code system. It is “a way of 
thinking. But the point is to live” (65). Already it can be seen that Camus’ desert is different than 
Nietzsche’s in that it does not attempt to unify, but uproot and rearrange. Nietzsche has a vision 
of the kingdom of the overman in the future while Camus is primarily concerned with the 
multifaceted present. It remains to be seen whether or not Camus is presenting a novel mode of 
thought or whether, like Nietzsche, his philosophy of the absurd opens up an “everything is 
permitted” space for murder like Mersault or even large scale genocide.    
Before evaluating Camus any further it is important to address concerns that an existence 
void of value would necessitate suicide. Although Nietzsche and Camus both uproot commonly 
accepted values, Nietzsche presents new values and hope to replace outdated ones. In a way, 
Nietzsche provides even a nihilist with a “reason” to live, even if this reason is hope in a future 
established through the exercise of will to power. Camus, on the other hand, provides no such 
reason. Thus a valid question arises from Camus’ proposed mindset: in a world void of hope for 
god or a future kingdom of men, what is the point of living? What stops one from committing 
suicide? Camus ardently advocates against suicide, saying that “killing yourself amounts to 
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confessing. It is confessing that life is too much for you or that you do not understand it” (5). 
Absurdity is not concerned with finding a meaning for life, because although one may exist, it is 
not up to the absurd person to reduce life to such a point. This “confession” is a giving in, a 
giving up, and a refusal to live in the permeating tension of absurdity. Furthermore, Camus says, 
“people have played on words and pretended to believe that refusing to grant a meaning to life 
necessarily leads to declaring that it is not worth living…one kills oneself because life is not 
worth living, that is certainly a truth – yet an unfruitful one because it is a truism. But does that 
insult to existence, that flat denial in which it is plunged come from the fact that it has not 
meaning?” (8). In this Camus adjusts the lens through which life is typically viewed, arguing that 
living and having a purpose for living are two fairly unrelated clauses and do not depend on one 
another. One marginalizes life and cuts oneself off from many aspects of life when this value of 
purpose reigns supreme. The absurd is only alive when one is doing just that, living. One keeps 
the absurd alive by “contemplating it…Suicide, like the leap, is acceptance at its extreme…In its 
way, suicide settles the absurd. It engulfs the absurd in the same death” (54). The absurd is alive 
in an individual’s contemplation of it; suicide not only leads to the death of a person but also 
finalizes the absurd by cutting off the tension in one direction. This difficult tension and struggle 
of an individual in the present moment requires that the person remain alive. In this Camus 
successfully argues against suicide while simultaneously evading ascribing any one overarching 
value to life. An absurd life is lived in the desert, void of hope for heaven or a future of man, 
unconcerned with anything but present rebellion where “the real effort is to stay there…to 
examine closely the odd vegetation of those distant regions” (10) without settling all questions 
through an act of suicide.     
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Camus advances beyond the idea of absurd Mersault when he introduces the figure of 
mythological Sisyphus, a man who was “condemned…to ceaselessly rolling a rock to the top of 
a mountain, whence the stone would fall back of its own weight” because he had stolen the gods’ 
secrets (119). Through Sisyphus Camus presents the idea of an “absurd hero,” revealing a new 
aspect to his philosophy: consciousness. Initially, one might think that Sisyphus holds the worst 
possible fate, a fate of perpetual torture, meaningless repetition and no possibility of escape or 
transformation. Camus, however, focuses on the moment when Sisyphus finishes pushing the 
boulder to the top, stops, and watches the rock roll back down. This moment is described as “a 
breathing-space which returns as surely as his suffering, that is the hour of consciousness… 
[Sisyphus] knows the whole extent of his wretched condition: it is what he thinks of during his 
descent. The lucidity that was to constitute his torture at the same time crowns his victory” (121). 
Although Sisyphus’ body is imprisoned, his mind is free to wander. If he were unconscious, the 
torture would not be as amplified but neither would his internal freedom: this is the irony of 
absurdity. Sisyphus’ freedom comes from taking “god” out of the equation, making “fate a 
human matter, which must be settled among men…His [Sisyphus’] fate belongs to him. His rock 
is his thing” (123). In a way, Sisyphus epitomizes the struggle of the absurd individual in the 
world. There is no reason for living, yet one continues to push one’s rock up a mountain. 
Moments of conscious rebellion constitute an individual’s freedom as present attentiveness 
becomes all and emerges one fully in the absurd. Camus’ re-imagined land is pieced together 
slowly; an air of tension flows through the desert as a conscious individual remains still, tortured 
and gratified by the absurd.  
After demonstrating the absurd in its raw state with Mersault and through a medium of 
consciousness with Sisyphus, Camus progresses even further in The Rebel, where he writes 
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about metaphysical rebellion and life at the meridian. At this point the question remains: does 
Camus’ philosophy advocate for Ivan’s position that “everything is permitted?” Is Camus 
proposing a newly envisioned land for an individual without god or is he just Nietzsche with a 
new mask? Camus gives a coherent response to these questions in his vision of an absurd rebel. 
This rebel, who “limits himself as a matter of principles…[and refuses] to be humiliated without 
asking that others should be. He will even accept pain provided his integrity is respected” (18). 
The image of the rebel is contrasted with “Ivan’s drama…[that] arises from the fact that there is 
too much love without an object. This love finding no outlet and God being denied, it is then 
decided to lavish it on human beings as a generous act of complicity” (19). An absurd, 
metaphysical rebel does not allow grandiose feelings about humanity let him or her be tied in a 
web of madness; instead, the rebel remains in the present and brings humanity down to a realistic 
level. The rebel does not say “yes” that everything is permitted but rather “from the moment that 
the rebel finds his voice – even though he says ‘no’ – he begins to desire and judge” (14). Even 
though this “rebellion…[which is] apparently negative, since it creates nothing, is profoundly 
positive in that it reveals the part of man which must always be defended” (19). Here, Camus 
shifts the fundamental motivation behind rebellion. No longer is the existential, metaphysical 
rebel a begrudged former child of god who desires a unifying principle to explain the suffering of 
the world. Rather, the rebel embodies lucid indifference of the present tense – by identifying 
what is worthy in oneself and demanding that the world meet one where one is. Camus’ 
paradigm shift in Nietzsche’s desert presents rebellion as a new value, making everything a 
present struggle, a human affair, and introduces a way to live without god or nihilism.  
In Camus’ last discussion, or what he calls “life at the meridian,” the problem of murder 
is finally addressed as a frontier beyond nihilism and the excesses of the 20th century. The rebel 
Robledo 19 
 
is against murder and injustice, but “if injustice is bad for the rebel, it is not because it 
contradicts an eternal idea of justice, but because it perpetuates the silent hostility that separates 
the oppressor from the oppressed” (283). There is no objective purpose behind the rebel’s fight 
against injustice, but rather there is this desire to keep the values of tension and rebellion alive, to 
acknowledge that no one should be the oppressor or the oppressed. In regards to murder Camus 
says that “the freedom to kill, is not compatible with the sense of rebellion. Rebellion is in no 
way the demand for total freedom. On the contrary, rebellion puts total freedom up for trial. It 
specifically attacks the unlimited power that authorizes a superior to violate the forbidden 
frontier” (284). As opposed to Nietzsche’s will to power and will to ultimate freedom of the 
individual, Camus recognizes that freedom itself is a value that must be questioned. Most likely, 
the ultimate freedom of one means the extreme oppression of another. A goal of the absurd rebel 
is keeping the absurd itself alive; suicide and murder both result in death, a frontier beyond 
present absurdity. And so, it appears that Camus is actually presenting rebellion within present 
tension as a new ethic, replacing Nietzsche’s will to power philosophy. The key difference 
between Camus’ rebel and Nietzsche’s overman is consciousness. An overman yearns for power 
over everything, and it has been demonstrated that this mindset can have drastic consequences in 
reality. The rebel, however, takes everything into consideration, has a “not everything is 
permitted mindset,” and actively works to live in tension. A rebel is from moment to moment 
creating his or her own rules for existence, attempting to avoid any sort of unifying moral that 
would justify them. Rebellion for the sake of rebellion, without knowing why or needing to – this 
is the essence of the conscious rebel.    
And so we arrive at the final question: how, then, does this rebel live?  Camus envisions a 
life for the rebel filled with moderation, which is “nothing but pure tension…it is in itself a 
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supplementary source of strength” (301). It is life at the meridian, in the gray area, which is not 
to be confused with a lukewarm state. One does not choose to believe in god, in nihilism, or in 
traditional ethics that would ease the tense unrest of daily existence. Rebellion is this “path of 
calculated culpability…it is perpetual struggle, and, sometimes, unparalleled joy when it reaches 
the heights of proud compassion” (297). One chooses perpetual struggle and tension so that one 
can have the right to own oneself, every aspect of oneself. With each degree of freedom there is a 
proportional amount of responsibility. Calculated culpability becomes this strategic 
consciousness and dazzling perception of the world that replaces “everything is permitted” with 
“not everything is permitted” void of specific instructions. One works out of a compassionate 
understanding such that one’s rebellion becomes a creative rebellion in sync with the struggles of 
humanity. At the end of it all the rebel must “learn to live and to die, and, in order to be a man, to 
refuse to be a god. At this meridian of thought, the rebel thus rejects divinity in order to share in 
the struggles and destiny of all men…lucid action, and the generosity of the man who 
understands” (306). Uneasy balance, life on a tightrope, existence on the ledge of a skyscraper: 
this is the vision that Camus imagines. This new land of nothingness and re-creation of 
Nietzsche’s frontier without traditional values or god allows a man without god to participate in 
empathy and responsibility without it all culminating in madness. Embracing contradiction, 
avoiding unity, and living life at the meridian – these are the actions of a rebel. In the end we get 
a picture of this rebel saturated in lucid indifference, creating in the midst of the desert, 
struggling in the fibers of tension between antimonies, and piecing together their own subjective 
universe of consciousness. Stale, thrumming nothingness is the atmosphere: the rebel 
nevertheless continues his or her creative work, and lives.  
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After a lengthy discussion of ephemeral creation and existential life through various 
works of Albert Camus and Friedrich Nietzsche, it is difficult to arrive at a definitive conclusion, 
especially regarding the fact that both of these philosophers would argue against absolutes and 
objectivity. The many groundbreaking ideas of Nietzsche have been evaluated and their 
weaknesses exposed. While Camus provides a much more palpable vision for an absurdist 
philosophy devoid of formal morality, one is still left with an aching feeling that overarching 
subjectivity is dangerous. It would not be a leap to say that human nature leans toward structure, 
toward rule following under a certain religion, state, or cult. Although this “herd” mentality has 
clearly led to much death and destruction, one is forced to wonder if absolute subjectivity in the 
hands of all would usher in sheer anarchy and nihilism. In this regard Camus is an extreme 
optimist, wanting power for all and none and believing that the absurd individual is capable of 
living in perpetual tension. On a concluding note, Camus says this at the end of The Rebel: “we 
shall remake the soul of our time…The bow bends; the wood complains. At the moment of 
supreme tension, there will leap into flight an unswerving arrow, a shaft that is inflexible and 
free” (306). Underlying Camus’ philosophy is this paradox: the creative, empathetic rebel yearns 
to live without any unifying principles, yet secretly desires a purpose. Camus wants to live 
without a religious or complete power-driven mindset, but still gets caught in a net of values. 
Here, Camus reveals that he does want this “unswerving arrow” to be set free through the 
tension; this image is absurd in itself, and does not quite conclude his thoughts but leaves 
something wanted and much unfinished. Camus, after all, it not Nietzsche and does ultimately 
want freedom, but it not quite sure how to arrive there. What is certain is that life is not an 
equation and it will not be solved. Taking this tension as one’s own, however, allows one to be 
free and inflexible, powerful and restricted, a lover and a hater. In this illusory mess an 
Robledo 22 
 
individual does not find a purpose for living but a secret joy in realizing that there does not have 
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